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Since World War II, the Netherlands has built a solid reputation as a ‘loyal 
ally’ of the United States. There have been serious disagreements between the 
two countries on specific policy issues, but there has remained an underly-
ing recognition among the Dutch that these should not disrupt a relationship 
considered fundamental. Within the context of US global power, the Netherlands 
have fulfilled several important functions. The country has been a close ally 
within international organizations such as NATO and the UN. It has acted as an 
ideal middle-power operating as a ‘bridge’ between Americans and Europeans 
(arguably far more suited to and more successful in this role than the United 
Kingdom). It has a long tradition as a nation defending the moral-legal order in 
international relations. And it has long been a proponent of free trade.1 Yet, in 
the early twenty-first century all these issues have been put to the test due to the 
increasing tendency towards US unilateralism. After surveying the importance of 
NATO for Dutch foreign relations since World War II, the chapter continues by 
outlining the issues of the last few years that have caused Dutch–American rela-
tions to become unsettled through the clash of security interests and international 
law. How has this close bilateral relationship been affected, and what are the 
prospects for the future?
The Cold War, NATO, and the End of Neutrality
After World War II, the Netherlands abandoned its policy of neutrality, held 
since 1839, by first signing the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and then joining NATO 
as a founding member in 1949. This move was backed by all the major political 
parties, not so much with enthusiasm, but as a logical necessity to bind the United 
States to the security system of Europe. The religious input (both Protestant and 
Catholic) into Dutch political and social life, combined with the standpoint of 
the strong Social Democratic party, resulted in solid anti-communist sentiments.2 
Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker, who signed the treaty, did attempt to withhold 
Dutch support in return for concessions from the United States, but this was not 
taken seriously in Washington.3 There was certainly discontent with the failure 
of the United States to wholeheartedly support the attempt to regain control of 
the East Indies, but the loss of this major colony in 1949 also proved pivotal in 
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redirecting Dutch security concerns to the Atlantic region.4 NATO immediately 
became and has remained the bedrock of Dutch security policy, leading to the 
much-used epithet of the Netherlands as a ‘loyal ally’.5 There have been three 
Dutch NATO secretary-generals (Dirk Stikker, Joseph Luns, and Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer), a record only matched by the British, a sure sign of American support 
for the binding role that the Dutch play so well in the Alliance.
There are many examples of the positive Dutch attitude towards NATO. The 
country supported the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into the organi-
zation, and the integration of German forces into a US-led Atlantic alliance was 
considered far more preferable than the option of a European defence commu-
nity. Although the Dutch disagreed with how President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
dealt with Suez, believing that the United States undermined the unity of the 
alliance, in the same month (November 1956) the parliament accepted the 
stationing of US nuclear weapons on Dutch soil to upgrade NATO defences. 
In 1958, the Netherlands was the first NATO ally were jet fighters were duly 
equipped with these weapons, which remained under the control of the US mili-
tary.6 In the 1960s, the Netherlands again proved to be steadfast in its backing for 
US leadership by rejecting the opportunity to develop a European nuclear force 
(the Multilateral Force plan). The Dutch also reacted quickly when de Gaulle 
withdrew from NATO’s central military command structure in 1966, swiftly 
agreeing to host US forces and the Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) 
command centre in Heerlen.7 In the late 1960s the US embassy in The Hague 
confirmed that ‘US–Netherlands relationships in NATO can be characterized as 
“special”’, and that it was essential to recognize ‘the value of a continued “special 
relationship”’.8
However, from the late 1960s onwards NATO did start to become the focus 
for criticism within Dutch politics and society. The rise of the New Left within 
the Labour party led to votes being held at its party congresses on whether the 
Netherlands should leave NATO. Despite being heavily defeated, these motions 
were a clear sign that the instinctively pro-NATO Cold War politics of the Dutch 
social democratic left was now over.9 Under the Labour-led coalition of 1973–77 
policy was dominated by pro-atlanticist ministers for both foreign affairs and 
defence, but the increasing dominance of the left in the party led to it opposing 
NATO’s 1979 Twin Track decision, involving the upgrading of NATO’s nuclear 
forces, throughout the following decade.10
The period from 1980–85 was the most tense for Dutch–American relations. 
The combination of a powerful peace movement with anti-nuclear sentiments 
within the large Labour and Christian Democratic parties created a vulnerable 
situation for a series of governments to accept the deployment of Cruise missiles 
on Dutch soil.11 Walter Laqueur’s typology of the Dutch idealist penchant 
for neutralism as ‘Hollanditis’ exemplified the perceived transformation of 
the Netherlands from loyal ally to the weak link in the NATO chain. Yet, the 
political and policymaking elite held firm, manoeuvring their way through both 
domestic opposition and foreign pressure to sustain the Dutch contribution to the 
Alliance.12
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The end of the Cold War brought with it a re-evaluation of Dutch foreign 
policy. Under Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo (1994–98) a deliberate attempt 
was made to shift attention to European developments in the wake of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the effort to build a common foreign and security policy. 
However, these deliberations only resulted in a major policy paper in 1995 that 
referred as much to the need to maintain traditional interests (transatlantic rela-
tions) as it did to new factors in world politics, such as the EU and the rise of 
East Asia.13 The choice for the transatlantic option, as Robert Russell pointed 
out almost 40 years ago, was a choice for freedom of action separate from the 
interests and demands of the Netherlands’ larger European neighbours, and this 
factor remained pivotal throughout the 1990s.14
US Unilateralism v. Dutch Multilateralism: Security Policy
Nevertheless, after 2000 the unilateralism of the Bush administrations put Dutch 
atlanticism to the test. Three examples are given here to illustrate the conse-
quences for the Netherlands of loyalty to the Western alliance under American 
leadership: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Joint Strike Fighter.
Iraq
Two days before the invasion of Iraq, on 18 March 2003, the Dutch government 
under Jan Peter Balkenende announced that they would adopt a position of political 
but not military support for the imminent war. This was despite the fact that there 
was considerable public opposition to the war, divisions in the government over its 
legitimacy, and a widespread belief that the path through the UN should be followed. 
In late May 2003, with President George W. Bush having declared the war to be 
over, Balkenende announced the placement of 1,350 Dutch military in Muthanna 
province in southern Iraq as part of the international stabilization force. In June 
2004, following a visit of Balkenende to Bush and heavy pressure from the United 
Kingdom, the government proposed and parliament agreed to extend the troops’ 
stay in Iraq until March 2005, but insisted that they would stay no longer. The troops 
were then withdrawn without much incident, having sustained two fatalities.
However, since then the Iraq issue has continued to rumble in Dutch politics. 
Firstly, in November 2006 the Volkskrant presented its readers with a Dutch 
Abu Ghraib. The newspaper released information that Military Intelligence and 
Security Service (MIVD) personnel had carried out violent interrogations in 
November 2003 in buildings of the Coalition Provisional Authority in the town of 
Samawah, about 230 miles southeast of Baghdad. Prisoners were forced to wear 
darkened goggles, which were sometimes removed and bright lights were shone 
at them. They were also kept awake for long periods by being soaked with water, 
and were exposed to high-pitched sounds.15 Coming 5 days before the national 
elections, these revelations seemed to be deliberately timed to have an impact on 
the results, and Defence Minister Henk Kamp demanded a full enquiry into how 
and why the information was released at that time.16
Dumbrell.indd   111 Dumbrell.indd   111 6/11/2009   2:07:28 PM 6/11/2009   2:07:28 PM112  Giles Scott-Smith
Secondly, there has been the question of why the Dutch government joined the 
‘Coalition of the Willing’, in stark contrast to the Belgians, Germans and French. 
In September 2002 Balkenende had received a ‘for your eyes only’ report from 
Tony Blair that held the intelligence information on the military threat posed by 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, including the background to the ‘45 minute’ claim. This 
was revealed in August 2003 by Balkenende during a parliamentary debate, and 
it became apparent that he had not discussed the issue with any of his ministers. 
The opposition parties, which included Labour, accused Balkenende of leading 
the Netherlands into support for the war based on false information from the 
British, although the then foreign minister and later NATO secretary-general, 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, insisted that the decision had been based not upon Iraq’s 
threat to the Netherlands but upon its endless refusal to comply with previous 
UN resolutions.17 Scheffer had even stated publicly in September 2002 that new 
UN resolutions were not necessary to justify a war against Iraq, a position which 
went further than any other US ally at that time.18 What is more, Kamp refused 
to allow a public examination of the views of the MIVD on the report from Blair 
and on the Iraqi threat.19 The official line was clear: It was the violation of UN 
resolutions, and not the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that 
led the Dutch government to support the war. It was therefore based on principle, 
not pre-emption.
However, as the full extent of the misinformation surrounding the Iraq war 
has gradually been revealed in both the United States and the United Kingdom, 
increasing scrutiny has been directed towards Balkenende’s original deci-
sion to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. The first critical examination of the 
Dutch decision-making process on Iraq appeared in the NRC Handelsblad on 
12 June 2004, which exposed the MIVD’s heavy scepticism over Iraqi posses-
sion of WMD in the run-up to the war.20 The MIVD did not encourage the same 
politicized conclusions from the intelligence on Iraq as the British and American 
governments did – but this did not prevent the Dutch government from ignoring 
the nuances and backing the war option. What is more, there was serious disquiet 
within the ministries of foreign affairs and defence over the lack of legitimacy 
for a war with Iraq if the Security Council did not sanction such a move. ‘These 
civil servants saw it coming that the Netherlands would face a principled choice 
between its clear atlanticist tradition and its reputation as champion of inter-
national law’, NRC Handelsblad noted, ‘could The Hague support the United 
States if, without a specific mandate from the Security Council, it began a war on 
its own?’21
Balkenende’s choice for ‘political, not military support’ seemed to be the way 
out in the short term, with the determination that Iraq had ignored twelve previ-
ous UN resolutions and had not cooperated with the UN weapons inspectors 
being enough to justify Dutch troops being sent to Iraq after the official end to 
hostilities had been declared. However, was it only ‘political support’? On 22 
March, 2 days after the invasion began, Air Force Lt. Col. Jan Blom, stationed 
with a Patriot missile NATO unit in Turkey but present in the Persian Gulf on a 
training mission, appeared at a major press conference behind US Army General 
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Tommy Franks. Franks was then able to include the Netherlands, alongside the 
British, the Australians and the Danes, as part of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ 
that made up the invasion force. An embarrassed Dutch government rushed to 
claim that it was all a mistake, Blom having been asked to join a meeting without 
any knowledge of what it was supposed to represent. Since then the suspicion 
has grown that it was no accident Blom was present that day. It has emerged that 
Dutch F-16s were conducting reconnaissance flights over Iraq already in late 
2002.22 Dutch Special Forces were active in northern Iraq in early 2003, and the 
submarine Walrus, under US operational command from June 2002, had been 
stationed in the Persian Gulf to observe Iranian naval units.23 It now appears that 
in late November 2002 the United States delivered a list of requests for military 
support to the Dutch government, including use of Rotterdam and Schiphol as 
transit points and an array of land, sea and air force units.24 It remains unclear 
what the precise reaction was from The Hague, but the signs are clear that some 
deals were made to ensure Dutch participation. The fact that de Hoop Scheffer, 
who clearly committed the Netherlands to the US–UK camp in late 2002, was 
named the next NATO secretary-general during that same period is also a clear 
sign of close cooperation between the two governments.25
At first a parliamentary enquiry into this affair seemed a definite possibility. 
Balkenende and his then coalition allies in the Liberal party steadfastly refused 
to accept this, but from 2003 until 2006 the Labour party, which possessed 
a major lead in the opinion polls during much of this period, held fast to its 
demand for such an enquiry. However, Labour failed to become the largest party 
in the November 2006 elections, and the most likely option for a new stable 
governing cabinet was through a Labour-Christian Democrat coalition. This put 
Labour’s demand for an enquiry up against the fact that its main target, Jan Peter 
Balkenende, was now the party’s most likely coalition partner. Compromise 
prevailed, and the subsequent coalition policy agenda announced in February 
2007 contained no mention of this issue, allowing the Socialist Party (SP) to 
outflank Labour on the left and pursue a public campaign to mobilize support 
for an enquiry. In July 2007 the SP, together with several other parties, secured 
a debate in the upper house of the Dutch parliament, but the resulting vote went 
39–36 against their enquiry proposal. Although members of the Labour party 
spoke out in support of the action, it was clear that the party’s decision to stand 
with the current coalition blocked further progress.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan became a political issue soon after the withdrawal of Dutch troops 
from Iraq. Although there were already around 600 Dutch military personnel 
in Kabul, in December 2005 the Dutch government under Balkenende sent 
1,750 extra troops to Uruzgan province as part of the International Security and 
Assistance Force (ISAF) being run by NATO, with the intention that they would 
remain there until August 2008. An attempt by the smallest coalition party (D66) 
to question the mission in particular, and the relationship with the United States 
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in general, failed to split the government. Parliamentary opposition faded once 
the Labour party were accommodated with promises that the main aim of the 
mission was to be reconstruction and not counterterrorism. Guarantees from the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Afghani government over the treat-
ment of any suspects that the Dutch might hand over to other authorities also 
swung opinion in favour. Above all, the need to maintain unity within NATO 
played a particular role in the positive Dutch decision.26
Nevertheless, problems remained. The then minister of defence, Henk Kamp, 
refused to clarify what exactly the Dutch attitude was towards the opium trade.27 
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reckoned that 87 per cent of the 
world’s opium production was from Afghanistan, where it was calculated that 
about 52 per cent of the GDP ($2.7 billion) came from this industry.28 The 2006 
harvest rose 47 per cent to around 6,700 tons, enough to produce 670 tons of 
heroin. Kamp did not deny that Dutch ISAF troops may become involved in the 
destruction of poppy fields if it fell under their task of supporting the regional 
Afghani government, even though this was not an official task of ISAF. Kamp’s 
problem was that the United States, under the guise of Enduring Freedom, wanted 
to act unilaterally to destroy the poppy harvest, in direct opposition to the official 
standpoints of both the ISAF and the Afghani government. With no alternative 
source of income, this policy threatened to increase support among the farmers 
for resistance against the military forces in Afghanistan – including the Dutch. 
In January 2007 the Afghan president Hamid Karzai finally stated that there 
would be no spraying of opium fields with pesticide from the air, thus reject-
ing US demands.29 However, Afghan forces have undertaken ground operations 
against the opium farmers, with potentially dangerous consequences for the ISAF 
mission.
Meanwhile, throughout 2007 the decision on whether the Dutch forces would 
remain longer than the August 2008 deadline gradually increased in signifi-
cance.30 Early signs indicated that there was a determination to push through an 
extension of the Dutch commitment. Defence Minister Eimert van Middelkoop 
stated openly in June 2007 that the cabinet had the ‘political intention’ to prolong, 
an honest announcement that got him into trouble for apparently ignoring the 
need to get parliamentary support. In August the chief of staff, Dick Berlijn, 
went a step further by declaring that it would be ‘a moral failure’ for a prosper-
ous nation like the Dutch to turn its back on the mission. Meanwhile, NATO was 
a constant factor in the political deliberations, something that van Middelkoop 
had admitted back in March when he said that pressures from abroad for a 
prolonging of the mission were growing. This pressure went public in September 
when the secretary-general of NATO, de Hoop Scheffer, with a complete lack 
of respect for diplomatic protocol, trumpeted that ‘no one can leave. No one is 
going to leave. I can honestly not believe that the Netherlands will be the only 
one to leave’. It was clear early on that the Dutch government was working hard 
to find other NATO partners to join it in the Afghan endeavour, a condition for 
its continued commitment. By the time of the NATO summit in Noordwijk in 
October sufficient, if limited, agreements had been reached with Hungary, the 
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Czech Republic, Slovakia, France (training units only) and possibly aspirant 
NATO member Georgia. Therefore, when on 30 November the Dutch cabinet 
finally announced that Dutch troops would be staying in Uruzgan until December 
2010, everyone had been expecting it for several months.31
Yet, the apparent straightforwardness of the decision hides some major 
complications. Despite previous agreements the Dutch forces have been coopted 
into Enduring Freedom operations over the past years, and hardline US tactics 
have not helped the confidence-building measures of the Dutch forces one bit. 
Some commentators, notably Ko Colijn, have pointed out that the Netherlands 
has effectively been drawn into the ‘Global War on Terror’ despite denying any 
connection with it. By associating the Netherlands’s security policy so closely 
with NATO, the Dutch government effectively had nowhere to go except to 
continue in Afghanistan. Since late 2007 de Hoop Scheffer and others have 
repeatedly stated that the future of NATO as a credible organization lies in how 
it deals with the Afghanistan mission. Under these circumstances any other 
decision by The Hague was impossible. Ever since the beginning of the Afghan 
mission the association with counterterrorism had been placed within the broader, 
more palatable cause of reconstruction and development, thereby preventing a 
cabinet split and abiding by the expected norms of Dutch foreign policy inter-
ests.32 However, despite the Dutch commitment, tensions remain with the United 
States, its main ally.33
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
The JSF story gives a perfect indication of strength of atlanticist opinion within 
the world of Dutch politics, the military and big business. In 2002, the govern-
ment agreed to join in the development of the Joint Strike Fighter, the intended 
successor to the F-16. The deal involved an investment of $800 million in the 
project, with the proviso that parts of the development and production would be 
channelled to Dutch companies. However, problems with the prototype meant 
that already in 2003 there were serious doubts over whether the final model 
would meet the expected requirements. Cooperation with partners, particularly 
the United Kingdom, ran into trouble when the United States refused to share 
the necessary technological specifications. Delays have moved full-scale produc-
tion back to 2013. Other higher-tech options, such as Unmanned Combat Aerial 
Vehicles, and the changing nature of warfare itself, have thrown other question-
marks at the JSF.34
However, the Dutch, in comparison with just about every other major contribu-
tor (British, Danish, Norwegian, Turkish, and – as observers – the Israelis) have 
kept a low profile during these difficulties and have not shown any interest in 
changing course. Potential competitors, such as the Eurofighter and the French 
Rafale, have not been considered as serious options, a clear reflection of the solid 
transatlantic perspective of Dutch industry, the Ministry of Defence, and the Air 
Force. In terms of outlook and material the Dutch military is fully ‘embedded’ 
in logistical compatibility with US forces. When the General Auditor’s Office 
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produced a critical report in October 2006, claiming that the total costs would 
eventually reach €14.6 billion for 85 aircraft, it was ignored by the govern-
ment.35 In November 2006, less than two weeks before the elections, the Ministry 
of Defence signed a Memorandum of Understanding to further commit the 
Netherlands to the JSF development process. Up to that point Dutch companies 
had earned a total of €720 million, even though it was budgeted in 2002 that a 
total of €6.2 billion would return to the Netherlands via business contracts. The 
signing just before the elections was deliberate. ‘The Labour party must now 
realize that the point of no return has been reached’, said Rob de Wit, manager of 
Philips affiliate Dutch Aero.36 Once again, as with the parliamentary enquiry into 
the Iraq war, the post-election coalition-building compromises forced the Labour 
party to retreat. A definite decision on whether or not to buy the JSF will now 
only be taken in 2010, at which point the Dutch will be so far involved it is hard 
to imagine any other outcome.
Dutch Multilateralism: The Importance of International 
Organizations
The JSF episode has exposed the Dutch commitment to atlanticism. With its 
economic landscape dominated by several influential multinationals, such as 
Shell, Unilever, KLM, Akzo Nobel and Philips, the Dutch were long committed 
to a free trade policy, and their reliance on foreign raw materials and markets 
ensured an internationalist outlook. Products and services delivered to the 
European Union, America, Asia and Africa generate close to 60 per cent of Dutch 
GDP. Commercial services dominate the national economy, with Rotterdam the 
largest sea port and Schiphol the third largest airport for freight traffic. The neces-
sity of a stable international economic order has therefore always been paramount 
for the Dutch, and they have contributed a great deal of expertise and commit-
ment within international organizations during the twentieth century to ensure 
this. This reflects their belief both in the necessity of achieving international 
order through negotiation and the need to secure Dutch interests by arranging 
compromises between the larger powers. As Voorhoeve noted, ‘An important 
means of indirectly exercising economic influence is by participation in interna-
tional conferences and organizations. Dutch delegations to international economic 
conferences and such bodies as the EEC, IMF, GATT, Benelux, OECD, World 
Bank and UN agencies have usually been large and active’.37
It was also not just a question of quantity, but also of quality. The Americans 
had great respect for the abilities of their Dutch counterparts in the foreign policy 
field. Alongside the three Dutch NATO secretary-generals, several other top 
officials played a key role in developing the post-war international landscape, 
such as Emile van Lennep (secretary-general of the OECD 1969–84) and Finance 
Minister Dr. Piet Lieftinck (executive director of the IMF 1956–76, director of 
the World Bank 1956–71). Within the EEC, prior to the entry of the United 
Kingdom in 1973 the Dutch fulfilled a crucial role in defending not only the 
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principle of free trade against French protectionism, but also in opposing de 
Gaulle’s attempt at political hegemony via the Fouchet plan. The Dutch always 
managed to maintain a positive approach to European integration within a 
consistent atlanticist context.38
Several US ambassadors have spoken openly about the importance of the 
Netherlands as both an international political hub and as an essential bilateral 
trade and investment partner. William Tyler (1965–69), who went to The Hague 
after serving as assistant secretary of state for European affairs, spoke of the 
country as an ideal ‘listening post’ for what was going on around Europe.39 His 
successor William Middendorf (1969–72) had this to say:
First off, in the Netherlands you have to understand, it’s all business, and 
they’re very practical . . . Charlie Tanguy here, who was then the Netherlands 
desk officer was able to arrange for a number of meetings in New York 
with major corporations like IBM and others, at Chase, and Citibank who 
had huge international departments doing business with the Netherlands, 
and Chemical Bank. We had a number of meetings there, and businessmen 
were giving us the benefit of where they thought the Netherlands fitted into 
the European scene, and how important the Netherlands was in the business 
sense, plus their role in NATO, OECD, and all the other functions where 
the Netherlands was a key leader in international organizations. It made 
my job very easy because at one point the Netherlands had the Secretary 
General of the OECD, the head of the Bank of International Settlements, 
Joseph Luns at NATO, and the [UN’s] Foreign Agricultural Organization 
chief.40
William Dyess (ambassador from 1981 until 1983) also referred to how
the Dutch were into everything. At that time they were the largest investors 
in this country. Now the British are, but they were the largest investors. They 
are into everything. They were in the Sinai and various peace-keeping forces. 
They were in the U.N. They were on the Security Council, the Common 
Market. You name it, the Dutch were in it.41
The bilateral economic relationship is considerable. The Netherlands remains 
the second largest investor in the United States behind the United Kingdom, 
and in terms of per capita investment it is way ahead. In 2001, it stood at $9,754 
per capita, compared to $3,629 for the United Kingdom and $1,252 for Japan. 
In the other direction, the United States has used the Netherlands as an ideal 
platform for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) within the Euro-zone. In 2003, the 
United States invested far more in the Netherlands than in any other EU state, 
around 10 per cent of all US FDI.42 As the JSF story shows, the two economies, 
or better said the two economic mentalities, are closely interwoven.
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US Unilateralism v. Dutch Multilateralism: International 
Law, Norms, and Values
In November 2006, the then foreign minister Bernard Bot outlined his vision 
on Dutch foreign policy in the Netherlands’ version of Foreign Affairs, the 
Internationale Spectator. Bot saw a necessary shift from the explicit ‘pure multi-
lateralism’ of the post-World War II era towards a ‘realistic multilateralism’ that 
would reflect the changing circumstances in international politics. Pure multilat-
eralism was characterized by commonly accepted rules and an equality before the 
(international) law that reduced the differences in power between nations. In this 
scenario the interests of the Netherlands coincided wholly with the interests of the 
most important international organizations, such as the EU, NATO and the UN. 
Looking at it from the perspective of Dutch tradition, the ‘norms and values’ of 
the pastor combined perfectly with the trading interests of the businessman. For 
Bot it was necessary to adjust to the fact that this post-war international order 
was now changing, due in part to the rise of new powers (China, India, Brazil) 
and the stagnation in the EU surrounding both internal and external policy. As a 
result, the Netherlands would continue to strive for its place in the world market 
and the maintenance of the international legal order, but it would do so out of its 
own national interest and no longer with the conviction that this could be blended 
perfectly into the common good.43
In contrast to his measured opinion in this article, Bot gave a speech at the 
Roosevelt Academy in Middelburg in January 2007 in which his analysis of 
the world situation went several critical steps further. Claiming that ‘the exist-
ing legal order is losing legitimacy’, Bot pointed to four cases where this was 
being demonstrated: The struggle over nuclear power with Iran; Serbia’s refusal 
to hand over war criminals as part of its passage towards EU membership; the 
2006 US–India nuclear deal, which violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and 
the arrest and detention of illegal combatants by the United States outside any 
accepted conventions of international law. It was remarkable to hear from a 
Dutch foreign minister that two of the four examples illustrating the breakdown 
in legal conventions directly involved the United States. For Bot, the position of 
the Netherlands, and specifically The Hague as the ‘legal capital of the world’, 
remains an essential aspect of Dutch national identity, and right should continue 
to prevail over might as much as possible. It has been precisely in this field that 
the main clashes between the Netherlands and the United States have taken place 
over the past few years, since the Bush administration began pursuing a unilat-
eralism deliberately unshackled from the need for international consensus. Two 
specific examples of this crumbling trust will be given here.
The ‘Hague Invasion Act’
On 1 July 2002 the Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC) came 
into effect, enabling the actual establishment of the ICC in The Hague. There had 
been much controversy surrounding this court, particularly concerning the refusal 
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of the United States to allow its nationals to come under its jurisdiction. On 
3 August 2002 President Bush signed the American Servicemembers Protection 
Act, a body of measures designed to deny the ICC any legitimacy. It soon became 
known as The Hague Invasion Act, since it included the authorization of the use 
of military force to liberate any American citizen, or citizen of a US ally, being 
held by the ICC.44 However much this may have been an act of clumsy intimida-
tion, the gratuitous rejection of Dutch identity and sovereignty in this legislation 
caused an understandably angry response from the Netherlands.
Extraordinary Rendition
In 2005, the issue of ‘extraordinary rendition’ became a major issue in Dutch–
American relations. During the 1990s there developed a practice of abducting 
criminal suspects in a third country in order to bring them to justice elsewhere. 
So long as there existed an official arrest warrant, there was cooperation between 
the abductors and the third country itself, and the aim was to bring the suspect 
before a court of law, then rendition could be defensible. Thus, President Clinton 
authorized Presidential Decision Directive 39 in the wake of the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, which stated that, if normal extradition procedures were 
unavailable or inapplicable, the support of local authorities could be requested to 
bring a suspect to the United States for trial. However, already during Clinton’s 
time there was discussion over the option of taking suspects to another country 
to avoid intelligence information leaking through the openness of the US court 
system. Therefore, even before 9/11 the procedure had altered from one of due 
process to one of information-gathering by any means necessary, including 
abducting and transporting suspects to countries whose security services had 
a proven record of torture, such as Morocco, Egypt and Syria.45 As ‘unlawful 
combatants’ in the War on Terror they were effectively removed from the estab-
lished norms of legal procedure.
When news of the secret prisons and clandestine CIA flights became known 
in late 2005, Foreign Minister Bot reacted strongly, stating that such illegal US 
activity could have consequences for Dutch participation in military missions 
together with the Americans, as in Afghanistan. Bot raised the issue in the 
NATO Council and received assurances from Secretary of State Condoleeza 
Rice that the United States did not torture and that the Netherlands had not been 
implicated in either the transport or detention of suspects. For the Dutch, it was 
essential that their identity as upholders of international law not be damaged by 
being implicated in these activities. It is clear that several European countries 
have cooperated in this process, with their security service personnel being able 
to question suspects abducted by the Americans and held at Guantánamo Bay, 
the Bagram base in Afghanistan, or other secret locations. As far as is known, 
the Dutch security service (AIVD) has cooperated in information-sharing but has 
not been present at any of the interrogation centres. Whether this would have 
been different had there been Dutch suspects involved remains an open ques-
tion. However, independent investigators have established that, between 2002 
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and 2006, at least six CIA flights had passed through Rotterdam airport and one 
through Schiphol.46
The announcement of President Bush on 6 September 2006, which confirmed 
the existence of the rendition programme and the secret prisons, came as a special 
blow to Bot, who admitted that his criticism of rendition had already led to ‘a 
small ice age’ between the Netherlands and the United States during that year.47 
Looking for a way out, Bot offered the services of Dutch legal expertise to try 
and find a way forward on the status of illegal combatants and where they fit 
within international law. At the end of 2006 an informal, independent interna-
tional commission was convened to study the problem in order to resolve the 
difference of opinion between the two countries. Bot himself, when asked in 
Middelburg in January 2007, did not give a clear picture on what the timetable for 
the commission was, or what influence it would have on Dutch or US policy, but 
he did mention that ‘the Americans are favourable about the group’ and its goals. 
The danger remains that the Dutch will be drawn into compromises with the 
Americans which will ultimately weaken their standpoint on international law, 
since it is highly unlikely that the Americans will abandon extraordinary rendi-
tion, its use of military tribunals, its lack of legal process and its use of torture 
simply because of Dutch moral concern. Looking to modernize the Geneva 
Conventions in order to accommodate US demands could therefore directly 
implicate the Netherlands in exactly what it wants to condemn.48
Conclusion: Plus ça change, plus ça meme chose?
Despite Iraq, despite Afghanistan, and despite the anti-Bush public mood, foreign 
policy did not feature prominently in the November 2006 Dutch parliamentary 
elections. The document that outlined the winning coalition’s policy agenda, 
adopted in February 2007 by the Christian Democrats, Labour, and the smaller 
Christian Union, referred to foreign policy in only two of its fifty-three pages.49 
Perhaps this apparent lack of interest was precisely because of the general anti-
Bush (and anti-EU) mood. There remains at this time no desire among the political 
class to confront the realities of Dutch atlanticism in an era of strong US unilat-
eralism, because this would mean accepting that a re-evaluation of principles 
was necessary. Minister Bot, the one member of the previous government who 
did raise serious concerns over US policies, was publicly rebuked by Minister-
President Balkenende and was not asked to retain his post in the new coalition. 
His successor, Maxime Verhagen, soon showed that he was not going to push any 
issue that might disrupt a smooth transatlantic relationship. Although there have 
been rumblings within the Labour party, the leadership successfully sidelined 
them and the coalition agreement has effectively killed them off. The Socialist 
Party, the one party that did present a broad election campaign agenda for foreign 
affairs, focused on transatlantic relations only in the sense of rejecting the limit-
less expansion of NATO’s mission, epitomized by ISAF in Afghanistan.
There are significant voices, notably Labour’s State Secretary for European 
Affairs Frans Timmerman, who have been calling for a general move away 
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from an automatic atlanticism towards a more flexible understanding of Dutch 
interests in a global political and economic environment. However, the question 
remains as to whether the opportunity will arise for such figures to demonstrate 
what this might mean in practice. Other signs of serious discontent have also been 
evident. In 2005, Karel van Wolferen, professor at the University of Amsterdam, 
published, together with journalist Jan Sampiemon, a book titled A Turning 
Point in the Nation’s History in which they called for a realistic understanding 
of how the first Bush administration had negated all accepted norms and values 
that provided the basis for the Atlantic community. The divide that was opening 
up between US national interests and the interests of a stable world order, they 
argued, was raising serious questions for the Netherlands. Emphasizing that he 
was not anti-American, van Wolferen at least wanted Dutch policymakers to deal 
with the fact that US policies were already breaking up the transatlantic alliance. 
No step forward could be made, in the direction of the EU, the UN, or wherever, 
without first addressing what was going on with the United States.
Why has this re-evaluation, pace Bot, not occurred? Van Wolferen listed four 
reactions to the current state of affairs. There are the ‘knee-jerk Atlanticists’ who 
would do anything to prevent a disruption to the ‘special relationship’. There are 
also those on the Right who express sympathy for the values of the neoconserva-
tive agenda and its call to bring democracy to the Middle East. On the Left there 
has been a too-easy tendency to categorize recent events as age-old US imperi-
alism, without recognizing how novel the current situation actually is. Finally, 
there are many ‘pragmatists’ who simply see no alternative to accepting US 
hyper-power, and who, in doing so, pass the initiative to Washington to continue 
benefiting from its divide-and-rule approach to European affairs.50 A year after 
their book’s publication, van Wolferen and Sampiemon commented bitterly 
on the inability to generate any meaningful interest or debate within the Dutch 
media on the how and why of the ‘Global War on Terror’. Official statements 
were accepted at face value, opinion pieces supporting US policy were regularly 
selected from American sources, and those who questioned these developments 
were marginalized. For these authors, the Netherlands, from lack of courage to 
face up to reality, had become little more than a ‘vassal state’ unable to appreciate 
how its leader was bringing it into greater danger:
Above all it is clear how strong the psychological blockage is in the 
Netherlands to accept that our protector from the past half century no longer 
provides protection. . . . The Netherlands had nothing to gain from the 
illegal occupation of Iraq. The NATO operation in Afghanistan is doomed. 
Meanwhile the inhabitants there have every reason to see the Netherlands as 
an accomplice of an aggressive power that is taking it out on their lives.51
For critics such as van Wolferen, Sampiemon, and fellow journalist Henk 
Hofland, there is a desperate lack of reflection on how to turn justifiable concern 
about US policies into constructive politics at the national level. The Dutch lead-
ership instead prefers to ignore, or at best downplay, the criticism, assuming that 
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there has been no ‘turning point’, only an awkward but temporary phase. The 
one moment when a serious reflection on Dutch commitments abroad could have 
occurred free of dogma was during 2002 when Pim Fortuyn led a remarkable 
upsurge of popular discontent against the established parties in the direction of 
the May 2002 elections. Fortuyn was unencumbered by tradition and voiced at 
various moments his disbelief in the worth of NATO and, in particular, his oppo-
sition to the JSF. Not long before the elections the then US ambassador Clifford 
Sobel visited Fortuyn and was able to convince him to accept the JSF. However, 
the extent of Fortuyn’s views on NATO in general were not to be known. On 
6 May 2002 Fortuyn was murdered outside a radio studio in Hilversum by a radical 
environmental activist, his death throwing his party into disarray and removing 
any chance of a wide-ranging re-assessment of Dutch foreign policy.
Since then there has been a return to normalcy. As the author of the ‘loyal ally’ 
thesis, Alfred van Staden, remarked in a think-piece in late 2006, any workable 
international order requires American cooperation, and attempting to achieve 
anything without the United States would only encourage its unilateralist tenden-
cies. In his view the EU offers no opportunity for alternatives since the malaise 
surrounding the constitution took hold (a malaise which the Netherlands played a 
central role in with the negative result of its referendum in June 2005). Only those 
nations that remain allies can expect to function as ‘correcting-mechanisms’ to 
reconcile US power with the demands of international law and legitimacy.52 This 
continues to be the dominant line in the Netherlands today. The special relation-
ship, despite accumulating criticism, remains intact.
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